Citizen
In Neither Settler nor Native, Mahmood Mamdani explains that the Nazi state separated Germans into three categories: citizen, national, and alien. The Third Reich adopted this terminology from contemporary US policy; until 1924 in the US, Native Americans were designated nationals but not citizens, and thus had fewer legal protections (Mamdani 106). Using a similar strategy of discrimination, the Nazi Party was able to carry out its agenda targeting Jewish Germans and other minority groups.
In “Prigg v. Pennsylvania,” Margaret Morgan was returned to slavery because of a Constitutional clause that “secure[d] to the citizens of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as property, in every state in the Union into which they might escape…” (Prigg v. Pennsylvania). As an African-American woman, Morgan was not considered a citizen. Instead, she was “property.”
Both of these violations of human rights highlight the power of the label of citizenship. The absence of citizenship has historically been wielded as a weapon to oppress marginalized groups. “Citizen” is not just a legal box to be ticked, but a physical barrier against potential atrocities.
Countermemorial
According to Marita Sturken, countermemorials “not only memorialize but also address the question of memory itself” (Sturken 71). Monuments, holidays, and dedications to past tragedies or triumphs abound in present-day culture. Recently, however, artists have felt the need to address significant events in a way that is both more conscious and inclusive.
Countermemorials are conscious of themselves and their context. Sturken explains that they create “a space for debate about memory and the past” (Sturken 71). In Democracy Moving, Ariel Nereson discusses “Black US American (counter)memorial practices that address histories of chattel slavery and their afterlives” (Nereson 4). A traditional memorial might directly represent chattel slavery, but the countermemorials that Nereson mentions also address the ways in which people have historically documented and thought about slavery. Due to these practices’ expanded meaning, one might think about the countermemorial as more self-aware than its predecessor.
Countermemorials are also designed to be inclusive. For example, The Other Vietnam Memorial (1991) displays the names of Vietnamese people who died in the Vietnam War (Sturken 71). In creating this, the artist was able to acknowledge those who were excluded by the government-commissioned monument to American veterans. Additionally, this countermemorial reminds us that the original monument was created as an act of patriotism and not with the intention of truly commemorating the full scope of loss.
Cruelty
In his 1985 speech on the Constitution, Brennan posits that we as the United States “fall short of the constitutional vision of human dignity…in our continued tolerance of State-administered execution as a form of punishment.” According to Brennan, execution is unconstitutional because it is “under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments” (Brennan 14). For Brennan, the death penalty exemplifies cruelty, which occurs when one “treats members of the human race as nonhumans” (Brennan 15). He sees cruelty as inextricably linked to dehumanization.
M. NourbeSe Philip includes fini, the Shona word for “cruelty,” in her glossary of “words and phrases overheard on board the Zong” (Philip 183-184). By specifying that cruelty was discussed in Shona, Philip suggests that it was the enslaved people who used this word to describe their experience, not the white crew members. Thus, cruelty for Philip, too, goes hand in hand with dehumanization.
In Inferno, God punishes cruelty in life with cruelty in Hell. Dante is disturbed by the suffering he sees in the Lower Circles, but Virgil frequently reminds him that those sinners are facing natural consequences for their past choices. Dante’s take on cruelty might support Brennan and Philip’s position that cruelty occurs alongside dehumanization; the suffering souls in Hell seem to be barely human, consumed by their pain. On the other hand, one might argue that it is quintessentially human to defy God and, consequently, face His justice.
Dehumanization
In the 1783 English court case Gregson v. Gilbert, the deaths of 230 enslaved people were classified as loss of property in an insurance battle. M. NourbeSe Philip criticizes the dehumanization of these people in Zong! by juxtaposing cold, impersonal phrases like “the ratio of murder” with vivid depictions of life and suffering (Philip). In this way, Philip highlights how systems of injustice ignore the humanity of oppressed groups.
Another historical driver of dehumanization is the colonial system in West Africa. Sylvia Tamale discusses its reduction of men and women to males and females, “‘instrumental vehicles for the reproduction of race and capital’” (Tamale 5). Tamale understands dehumanization as a tool of systematic oppression. Both she and Philip primarily portray dehumanization as perpetrated by oppressors and affecting the marginalized.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu goes one step further in his analysis of dehumanization. In No Future Without Forgiveness, he explains that Apartheid dehumanized those who enforced it in addition to its victims: “What dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me” (Tutu). The loss of humanity that Tutu describes is not an effect, but a vicious circle. This expands upon Philip and Tamale’s depiction of dehumanization.
Discipline
According to Michel Foucault, discipline is a method characterized by three functions: first, it enables “the meticulous control of the operations of the body”; second, it assures “the constant subjection of [the body’s] forces”; third, it imposes “a relation of docility-utility” on the forces of the body (137). Although Foucault portrays discipline as overreaching and oppressive, he acknowledges that it produces increased utility. To illustrate this, he describes John Baptist de La Salle’s process of designing an education for boys from all social classes. In his schools, La Salle implemented a rigorous system of control. Although La Salle’s attention to the “little things” (140) seems extreme, it also allowed for “mutual improvement” (167). For example, La Salle instructed the Brothers to improve students’ handwriting by controlling their every movement: “‘A distance of two fingers must be left between the body and the table; for not only does one write with more alertness, but nothing is more harmful to the health than to acquire the habit of pressing one’s stomach against the table…” (157).
Foucault argues that discipline’s ability to increase utility differentiates it from slavery, since slavery relies on the “appropriation of bodies” and discipline does not (137). However, Michelle Alexander points out that discipline actually upheld the racial order upon which slavery was built (60-98). Discipline may differ from slavery in nature, but the two concepts are not unrelated. Historically, discipline has been a key component of racist systems like slavery.
Duty
In “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” Kant claims that “there [exists] a practical law which by itself commands absolutely and without any further motives.” According to the philosopher, “the following of this law is duty” (Kant 535).
Duty, the following of the moral law, is at the core of Kantian ethics. Crucially, duty is the only motive that can give an action moral worth. This means that even if someone’s action complies with the moral law, it is not morally correct unless he does it specifically because he knows it is his duty to act in such a way.
Kant also outlines what he calls “the universal imperative of duty” (Kant 534). According to this idea, every person should act as if her action were going to become a law to which everyone else in the world must adhere. In any given situation, one can determine her duty (or how to correctly follow the moral law) by testing the universality of her action. Therefore, Kant’s understanding of duty is important because it is the means by which humans adhere to the moral law.
Peter Singer redefines duty by redrawing the “traditional distinction between duty and charity” (Singer 235). He argues that actions that might be “called “supererogatory,’ [or] good to do, but not wrong not to do,” are less common than many philosophers would like to believe. Thus, in his line of ethics, duty encompasses more than it does for other ethical theorists.
Singer, like Kant, believes that upholding one’s duty is how one follows the moral law. He makes this clear when he argues that people “ought” to donate to charity and feed the hungry. He explains that he uses the verb “ought” to “‘express duty or obligation’” (Singer 233). Therefore, Singer’s idea of duty encompasses a wide range of actions benefiting society. Many traditional philosophers might disagree with the scope of what Singer considers necessary to follow the objective moral law that Kant described.
Freedom
André Lepecki begins his article “Choreopolice and Choreopolitics” by quoting historian Hannah Arendt. She suggests that “‘the meaning of politics, which is also its aim or direction, is freedom’” (Lepecki 14). Lepecki adopts this definition in his own study of political movement. He argues that political movement is freedom.
Lepecki connects freedom to dance because “choreography also implements, needs, produces, and reproduces whole systems of obedience” (Lepecki 16). By reimagining the political through dance, choreographers can map “that which blocks, directs, diverts, and (pre)conditions our movements” (Lepecki 18). For example, the performance Tatlin’s Whisper #5 reveals “the intimate relation between choreographic commands, police work, [and control]” (Lepecki 18). Dances about political movement allow performers and viewers to identify and begin to tackle barriers to freedom.
Political movement, or freedom, interacts with the law as well as choreography. Giorgio Agamben’s article “The State of Exception” studies how totalitarian regimes enshrine exceptions to the law into the law itself. These exceptions lie “‘at the intersection of the legal and the political’” (Agamben 1) since they are implemented during times of political crisis. Agamben demonstrates how, in the state of exception, political movement both rejects and relies on the law. If political movement is oriented toward freedom, then freedom maintains this same relationship with the law. While choreography points out barriers to freedom, the law simultaneously upholds and tears down those barriers.
Particularism
In “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Charles Mills defines particularism as a school of thought that denies the existence of “nontrivial general moral principles” (Mills 173). He focuses on group-based particularism, which he claims arises due to the underrepresentation of minority groups’ unique experiences in society. Particularism acknowledges these “distinctive experience[s]” by rejecting “hegemonic principles” (Mills 173). Though Mills acknowledges that group-based particularism rightfully attempts to fill an empty space in society, he says that it nonetheless presents several dangers to ethical theory. One of these dangers is relativism, and another is the labeling of patterns of injustice as cultural practice. By mentioning group-based particularism and reframing it as a response to the deficiencies of ideal theory, Mills supports his overarching claim that nonideal theory is the more effective approach to ethics.
In “Nomos and Narrative,” Robert Cover uses particularism to describe strong forces. Strong forces, or shared beliefs and identity, are essential to the creation of a “paideic” nomos, a society in which the law is effective because people share a common set of values (Cover 12). Cover calls strong forces particularist because they are shared by a group of people who, at some level, define themselves by those forces. If strong forces are particularist and also essential to the creation of a strong government, then it seems that Cover endorses particularism, at least to some extent. Cover’s application of group-based particularism to nomos demonstrates why particularism is important not just to Mills’s context of ethical theory, but more expansively to the law and the society it governs.
Power
Miranda Fricker, philosopher and author of Epistemic Injustice, puts forth the following definition of social power: “a practically socially situated capacity to control others’ actions, where this capacity may be exercised (actively or passively) by particular social agents, or alternatively, it may operate purely structurally” (Fricker 13). This definition identifies two forces that execute power: social agents and pure structure. These two ideas build on the work of Thomas Wartenberg and Michel Foucault, respectively.
In his 1975 book Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that “it does not matter who exercises power” because power is not about individuals but about a distribution of bodies (Foucault 202). Foucault makes this point while analyzing Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. While the Panopticon is an important illustration of power, it is also a machine. Fricker draws from Thomas Wartenberg’s writing in order to reconcile Foucault’s ideas with her own more human approach to power. As Foucault shows that power can be structural, Wartenberg shows that it can be specific to individuals or groups. He uses the example of a teacher who grades her students’ work keeping in mind the GPA expectations of their future employers (Fricker 12). Fricker adopts Wartenberg’s more personal thinking in her definition of power.
Fricker emphasizes the social situation of power in order to understand how prejudice leads to injustice. Prejudices are both specially tied to individuals and part of a larger mechanism of power. Understanding power as a simultaneously social and structural phenomenon allows for the conceptualization of certain types of injustice.
André Lepecki explains that the police force represents a “generalized function of power” because it is “not confined to the bodies and tasks of police officers” (Lepecki 19). While Lepecki considers the actual social agents who execute power, police officers, he concludes that police power is ultimately structural. This suggests that the key to understanding how power is executed is not a matter of choosing one agent over another as Fricker posits, but a matter of analyzing power from different levels, at both a social and structural level.
Property
John Locke thought that a man secures property rights to an object when he removes it from “the state nature leaves it in” (Locke Sect. 28). When it comes to land, a man may call a plot his own once he has worked the earth (Locke Sect. 32). These criteria illustrate the importance of labor to Locke’s conception of property.
Robert Nozick challenges Locke’s theory of property acquisition, arguing that it is too broad and unsupported a statement that property is simply a function of labor: “Why does mixing one’s labor with something make one the owner of it? […] Why should one’s entitlement extend to the whole object rather than just to the added value one’s labor has produced?” (Nozick 736). By asking questions such as these, Nozick attempts to adjust Locke’s philosophy to a modern world characterized by limited resources and stringent property laws. However, Nozick still associates property with labor. His assertion that “[t]axation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (Nozick 735) suggests that our labor is our own.
In Zong!, M. NourbeSe Philip criticizes Gregson v. Gilbert’s treatment of enslaved people as property: “those who had helped in the massacre could [not] be charged with murder, since what was destroyed, being property, was not capable of being murdered” (Philip 191). This criticism supports Locke’s assertion that “every man has a property in his own person” (Locke Sect. 27). Locke’s concision, while powerful, does call for additional analysis like Nozick’s, especially when it comes to horrific rights violations such as slavery.
Punishment
In “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” Joel Feinberg explains that punishment differs from penalty because it has a “symbolic significance” (Feinberg 400). He elaborates that punishment serves as an expression of condemnation. For example, a prison sentence shames the wrongdoer and is thus a form of punishment. On the other hand, a penalty such as a license suspension “can inflict a deprivation without any scolding, express or implied” (402).
In her 2007 art installation Shibboleth, Doris Salcedo exhibited a long crack in the concrete floor of the Tate Modern in London. This allowed her to exact a form of punishment on the art institution hosting her project. Her punishment expressed a condemnation of “colonialism, slavery and segregation” (MOLAA). Salcedo’s artwork demonstrates the symbolic significance of punishment outside of a legal context.
According to Feinberg, symbolic condemnation “poses a special problem for the justification of punishment” because it can “magnify…suffering” (418-419). He lists solitary confinement, which is not exactly painful but certainly cruel, as one example of this problem (419).
After Salcedo’s exhibition left the Tate, a scar remained on the concrete floor of the institution. The scar serves to represent the “historical marks left on our history by colonialism, slavery and segregation” (MOLAA). Although this scar is a representation of other scars, it also marks the museum itself. Therefore, Salcedo’s punishment causes long-term suffering in the form of a scar as it condemns society’s past wrongdoings. Salcedo’s installation is unique because it both represents painful history and asks how pain results from pursuing punishment as a remedy for past injustice.
Reification
In her Harvard Law Review article “Whiteness as Property,” Cheryl Harris discusses how the “law constructed ‘whiteness’ as an objective fact, although in reality it is an ideological proposition imposed through subordination” (Harris 1730). Harris’s article reveals how whiteness is protected by US law. Courts protect the “expectations of white privilege” (Harris 1784), and in turn whiteness acquires real substance.
The law is able to construct whiteness through reification. This is the process by which “‘a relation between people takes on the character of a thing’” (Harris 1730). The word “reification” comes from the Latin for “thing” and “to make” (“Reification”). The law makes whiteness a thing through reification.
Reification is harmful because it supports whiteness and thus reproduces Black subordination. It also subordinates other people in society. According to Nancy Fraser, author of Rethinking Recognition, identity politics put “moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture” (Fraser 112). This creates one “drastically simplified group-identity which denies the complexity of people’s lives” (Fraser 112). This process is an example of harmful reification. When the concept of a single group-identity is realized, the voices of marginalized individuals are lost.
While Harris considers the consequences of reification in a legal setting, Fraser traces the negative effects of reification in social movements. Harris views reification as a deliberate tool of oppression while Fraser studies it as an effect of overly simplistic strategies of changemaking. Despite this difference, both authors agree that reification is harmful.
Silence
According to Charles W. Mills, ideal theory encourages silence on oppression (Mills 168). When ethical theorists fail to address oppression, they exclude marginalized groups and hamper potential progress. Thus, for Mills, silence is the absence of representation, and it has detrimental effects.
Michel Trouillot thinks that “any historical narrative is a particular bundle of silences, the result of a unique process.” Furthermore, he argues that “the operation required to deconstruct these silences will vary accordingly” (Trouillot 27). Where Mills maintains that society should work to fill a series of similar silences, Trouillot views silence as structurally complex and not easily fixed, since it is inherent to history. He points out that silence can be imposed in a number of different ways, and thus cannot be resolved with a single theory. Moreover, the battle with silence is ongoing because silences are continuously created.
Of course, Mills discusses silence in the context of philosophy and ethical theory while Trouillot is focused on historical narratives, so differences in their understandings of silence are to be expected. However, Trouillot’s understanding that silence can be born of something so simple as writing a historical record expands upon Mills’s more traditional view of silence as a clearly-bounded and resolved entity.
Surveillance
According to Sarah Brayne, author of Predict and Surveil, “we are all subjects of digital surveillance” (2). Surveillance is omnipresent, at least in its digital form. Two types exist: dragnet and directed. Dragnet surveillance collects information on everyone, while directed surveillance follows individuals (14).
In Tracking Transience, Hasan M. Elahi uses dragnet surveillance to speak out against his own experience with the FBI’s directed surveillance. Elahi overloads the digital algorithm with a wealth of useless information, turning the computer’s own dragnet capabilities against it. Elahi’s project indicates that surveillance, though omnipresent, is conquerable.
Michel Foucault’s discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon reveals the regulatory effects of constant surveillance. The Panopticon is a carefully organized design for a prison, and it “make[s] it possible to see constantly” (Foucault 200). Significantly, this constant surveillance does more than simply rob individuals of their privacy. Foucault explains that the Panopticon “assures the automatic functioning of power” (201). When individuals are surveilled, they come under the force of a strict governing order. For this reason, contemporary society’s reliance on surveillance in areas like police work poses challenges to individual rights.
Testimony
The centerpiece of Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s 2019 installation “Earwitness Theatre” is a sound library. Using the library, Hamdan hoped to access the traumatic memories of people who had “heard but never seen” human rights violations (“Lawrence Abu Hamdan”). The idea of earwitnesses’ testimonies was crucial to his process. By acknowledging the role that sound plays in testimony, Hamdan extended the boundaries of what could be considered testimony.
In “Death and the Maiden,” a 1990 play by Ariel Dorfman, the main character testifies to her experience as a political prisoner. Like the earwitnesses in Hamdan’s installation, this character remembers her captivity primarily through sound. For political reasons, she is unable to deliver her testimony to a court of law. Thus, one of the questions that Dorfman’s play raises is whether unofficial or unrecognized testimony can lead to justice.
In “Death and the Maiden” and “Earwitness Theatre,” trauma survivors are able to give auditory testimony in unofficial ways. Both Hamdan and Dorfman ask audiences to consider if sound is valid evidence and whether informal testimony can produce justice.
White Supremacy
In her 1993 Harvard Law Review article, “Whiteness as Property,” Cheryl Harris borrows Frances Lee Ansley’s definition of white supremacy: “a political, economic, and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources.” By defining white supremacy as a system rather than an attitude, Harris communicates its wide influence and deep roots. She further elaborates that in the system of white supremacy, “relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted’” (1714). Not only is this system far-reaching, but by virtue of its area and interconnectedness, white supremacy inherently resists dismantlement.
Ta-Nehisi Coates expands on this resistance while specifically connecting white supremacy to the subordination of the African American community in the United States. He maintains that, under the system of white supremacy, people “with a certain ancestry should always be ensured that they will not sink to…the level occupied by Black people” (Moyers 1:26). White supremacy is more than a rigid system of social organization controlled by white people—it actively works to assign African American people to a lower level in its hierarchy in its “daily reenact[ment].”
It is crucial to define white supremacy as a system in order to understand how it functions to subordinate African Americans and maintain white control.
Works Cited
Citizen (Fall 1/8)
Edward Prigg, Plaintiff in Error, v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant in Error. Supreme Court of the United States, 41 U.S. 539, 1842.
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Nuremberg: The Failure of Denazification.” Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020, pp. 105–120.
Countermemorial (Fall 2/8)
Nereson, Ariel. “Introduction.” Democracy Moving : Bill T. Jones, Contemporary American Performance, and the Racial Past, University of Michigan Press, 2022, pp. 1–25.
Sturken, Marita. “Cultural Memory in the Wake of Violence: Exceptionalism, Vulnerability and the Grievable Life.” Rethinking Peace: Discourse, Memory, Translation, and Dialogue, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2019.
Cruelty (Fall 3/8)
Alighieri, Dante. Inferno: A New Verse Translation by Michael Palma. Translated by Michael Palma, W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.
Brennan, William. “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification.” Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 12 October 1985.
Philip, M. NourbeSe. Zong! Wesleyan University Press, 2011.
Dehumanization (Fall 4/8).
Philip, M. NourbeSe. Zong! Wesleyan University Press, 2011.
Tamale, Sylvia. Decolonization and Afro-Feminism. Daraja Press, 2020.
Tutu, Desmond. No Future Without Forgiveness. Doubleday, 1999.
Discipline (Spring 1/8)
Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. The New Press, 2012.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books, 1977.
Duty (Fall 5/8)
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785.
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Wiley, JSTOR, 1972, Accessed 16 Oct. 2017.
Freedom (Spring 2/8)
Agamben, Giorgio. “The State of Exception.” The University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Lepecki, André. “Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: or, the task of the dancer.” The MIT Press, 2013.
Particularism (Fall 6/8)
Cover, Robert. “Nomos and Narrative.” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 97:4, 1983.
Mills, Charles W. “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.” Hypatia, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 165-184. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3811121.
Power (Spring 3/8)
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books, 1977.
Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
Lepecki, André. “Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: or, the task of the dancer.” The MIT Press, 2013.
Property (Fall 7/8)
Locke, John. “Second Treatise of Government.” The Project Gutenberg eBook of Second Treatise Of Government, by John Locke, 22 Apr. 2003, www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm?ref=americanpurpose.com.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974.
Philip, M. NourbeSe. Zong! Wesleyan University Press, 2011.
Punishment (Spring 4/8)
Feinberg, Joel. “The Expressive Function of Punishment.” The Monist, Vol. 49, No. 3, Oxford University Press, July 1965, pp. 397-423.
MOLAA. “MOLAA | Museum of Latin American Art.” MOLAA | Museum of Latin American Art, 2010, molaa.org/salcedoshibboleth.
Reification (Spring 5/8)
Harris, Cheryl I., “Whiteness as Property.” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 8, p. 1707, 1993.
Fraser, Nancy. “Rethinking Recognition.” New Left Review, May 1, 2000, ProQuest.
“Reification.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reification.
Silence (Fall 8/8)
Mills, Charles W. “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.” Hypatia, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 165-184. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3811121.
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Beacon Press, 1995.
Surveillance (Spring 6/8)
Brayne, Sarah. Predict and Surveil: Data, Discretion, and the Future of Policing. Oxford University Press, 2020.
Elahi, Hasan M. Tracking Transience, 2003-present.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books, 1977.
Testimony (Spring 7/8)
Dorfman, Ariel. Death and the Maiden, Nick Hern Books, 1996.
Hamdan, Lawrence Abu. “Earwitness Inventory.” Mixed media installation, 2018.
“Lawrence Abu Hamdan Earwitness Theatre.” Contemporary Art Museum St. Louis, 2019.
White Supremacy (Spring 8/8)
Harris, Cheryl I., “Whiteness as Property.” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 8, p. 1707, 1993.
Moyers and Company. “Facing the Truth: The Case for Reparations.” YouTube, YouTube Video, 23 May 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pm9DJuTrO8Q.
